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CHAPTER
Institutional quality and participation 
in global value chains
DAVID DOLLAR AND MATTHEW KIDDER
One way to think about products that have com-plex value chains is that they are contract-intensive goods. That is, they often involve many exchanges among different firms, each facing some risk of 
contract nonperformance by others in the chain. This chap-
ter reviews research on global value chains (GVCs) showing 
that, other things equal, countries with better institutions such 
as stronger property rights and rule of law participate more in 
GVCs.1 It investigates whether this finding holds up within coun-
tries. Using China as an example, it finds that Chinese cities that 
score better on property rights and government efficiency are 
more likely to have firms involved in GVCs. It also applies the 
findings on institutions and GVCs to African economies, which 
have only a small role in GVCs, finding that many African econo-
mies have weak institutions or neighbors with weak institutions, 
an important reason for their small role in GVCs.
Ever since Ricardian trade theory emerged in 1817, econo-
mists have considered that relative comparative advantage in 
productivity should promote specialization within a country. At 
the firm level these classical theories describe why firms might 
participate in GVCs. For example, a firm in China may have a 
global comparative advantage in production processes that are 
labor intensive but perhaps a comparative disadvantage in other 
stages of production. The firm should offshore the processes in 
which it has a comparative disadvantage and export the labor-
intensive portion of production.
But these classical frameworks are inadequate for craft-
ing policies to deepen GVC participation because they do not 
account for asymmetric information. Consider another exam-
ple. Policymakers may want to advance the competitiveness of 
domestic industries that use higher technologies and employ 
higher skilled workers. The textbook Ricardian solution would be 
for the government to sponsor investment in technologies that 
boost the productivity of desirable industries, thus giving these 
industries a Ricardian comparative advantage. The implication is 
that the product in this industry could then be exported, thus 
expanding the country’s GVC participation in this industry. But 
it is not clear that such simple plans for economic development 
will prove fruitful without a careful consideration of economic 
institutions. Institutions can resolve or worsen distortions arising 
from asymmetric information, and classical models remain silent 
on this point.
To promote GVC participation in industries that drive eco-
nomic development, policymakers have to improve domestic 
institutions and take regional initiatives to improve the institu-
tions of neighboring countries. This chapter thus studies how 
domestic institutional quality and the institutional quality in 
neighboring countries influence the integration of domestic 
industries in GVCs. It looks at new empirical research on institu-
tions and GVC participation and on the effects of institutions in 
neighboring countries. Finally, it examines Africa’s involvement in 
GVCs to show what is holding back its participation.
Institutions and participation in global 
value chains
The business services industry in China illustrates the challenges 
that institutions create in expanding global competitiveness in a 
sector. Chinese policymakers would like to promote the global 
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competitiveness of industries that are more skill intensive and 
higher on the value chain. The business services industry has 
both of these desired qualities. But it is unclear which policies 
will build the comparative advantage and deepen GVC participa-
tion in business services. Classical trade models might suggest 
that Chinese business services should already have a compara-
tive advantage. The Chinese economy has an abundance of the 
primary production factors of business services: both a strong 
information technology infrastructure and a large, educated 
work force. Despite these strengths, its business services sector 
is smaller than that in a developed country such as the United 
States.
Looking at the share of information, computing, and other 
business services as a share of total value added for China and 
the United States over 1985–2005 reveals a clear gap (figure 7.1). 
This gap should puzzle policymakers who apply classical rea-
soning. Chinese business services should already have a com-
parative advantage, but the industry is still small and largely 
underdeveloped.
This chapter sheds additional light on such puzzles by show-
ing that institutions are fundamentally important, both for com-
parative advantage and for deepening GVC participation in 
industries that produce a more complex and customized prod-
uct. The output of business services fits both categories. The 
chapter shows the importance of the U.S. legal system in driving 
the gap between Chinese and U.S. businesses in this sector. By 
providing strong protection for contract disputes, the U.S. legal 
system contributes to the U.S. comparative advantage, which 
makes the United States a leading exporter of business services.
The case of business services can be extended to other indus-
tries. The importance of legal institutions increases as products 
become more differentiated. In manufacturing the underlying 
logic is that there is a thinner market for differentiated goods 
than for commodities. Thin markets, with fewer potential buyers, 
lead to what is called a “hold-up,” where there is an incentive to 
renegotiate terms after production has begun. For example, the 
completed engine of a Boeing jet may be more difficult to sell 
than a shipment of agricultural products if the buyer decides to 
cancel the order after production is complete. This moral hazard 
problem leads to market inefficiencies if legal institutions cannot 
enforce contracts. The legal system can reduce this problem if 
the court can transfer legal ownership of real property, thus forc-
ing the defaulting party to pay.
Another challenge is that contracts are not complete, in the 
sense that a contract cannot specify an agreement for every pos-
sible contingency. Thus, in many conditions even the best con-
tract will not provide a remedy. A well-functioning legal system 
can alleviate contract incompleteness if the system equitably 
protects rights. Both contract enforcement and equitable pro-
tection of rights thus interact at an industry level with the con-
tracting intensity of the industry. The more differentiated and 
contract-intensive the product, the more severe is the asymmet-
ric information problem in the absence of equitable protection 
and credible enforcement.
Looking at the 10 most and 10 least contract-intensive man-
ufacturing industries, as estimated by Nunn (2007), reveals that 
the most contract-intensive industries generally have a finished 
product that incorporates a higher level of technology and thus 
is higher in economic development (table 7.1). Given this distri-
bution of institutional sensitivity across industries, it is not sur-
prising that institutions have a strong influence on economic 
growth and development (Robinson, Acemoglu, and Johnson 
2005). Policymakers in resource-rich economies and developing 
economies naturally want to make contract-sensitive industries 
more globally competitive.
In addition to legal systems, financial institutions are funda-
mental to deepening global competitiveness and GVC partici-
pation. And as with legal institutions, how important financial 
institutions are in fostering GVC participation differs across 
industries. Funding projects in contract-intensive industries can 
be constrained by asymmetric information, just as in the goods 
market, partly because asymmetric information in the goods 
market causes uncertainty in the returns of the investors who 
own capital in these industries. Indeed, property rights protec-
tion is a more binding constraint on investment than external 
access to finance (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 2002). In 
addition, transparency and consistency in accounting methods 
in estimating returns on investment can be more important for 
projects with complex transactions than for simple exchanges.
FIGURE 7.1 Value added in business services as a 
percentage of GDP in China and the United States, 
1985–2005
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Source: EU KLEMS database and the associated CIP database (http://euklems 
.net/index.html, accessed 1 September 2016).
Note: The figure shows value added in KLEMS (K-capital, L-labor, E-energy, 
M-materials, and S-purchased services) industries 71–74 as a share of total 
value added in the economy.
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The role of informal institutions such as social networks is 
somewhat different from that of formal institutions. Informal 
institutions can benefit groups that are less likely to participate 
in GVCs. And they often arise where formal institutions cannot 
resolve asymmetric information problems (Leff 1978; McMillan 
and Woodruff 1999; Bigsten and others 2000; Rauch and Trin-
dade 2002; and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009). But they 
are not perfect substitutes. And they do not follow the rule that 
the institution be equally shared by all agents in an economy. If 
informal institutions such as social networks favor a group that is 
less likely to participate in GVCs, they could reduce GVC partici-
pation at the industry level.
The expansion of GVCs across international borders encoun-
ters meaningful discontinuities for both countries and industries: 
institutions vary across countries, while sensitivity to these insti-
tutions varies across industries. To understand how institutions 
affect the pattern of GVC participation, Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) 
bring industry- and firm-level evidence to this question. The 
industry data trace interactions in the value chain through input-
output linkages, while the firm data help in understanding the 
determinants of GVC participation.
Industry evidence
Institutional quality at the country level is positively related to 
participation in more complex GVCs. The distinction between 
complex and simple trade flows is made possible by new mea-
sures of GVC participation developed by Wang and others (2016) 
and Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2015), which build on Koopman, Wang, 
and Wei (2014). This new industry–country measure spans 35 
industries and 41 countries from 1996 to 2011. The measure gives 
a rich picture of GVC participation by decomposing trade flows 
based on value added. One benefit of this decomposition is that 
it can differentiate trade flows that cross borders multiple times 
(complex GVC participation) from those that cross only once 
(simple GVC participation).
At the industry level, Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) found a pos-
itive correlation between GVC participation and all measures 
of institutional quality (see table A7.1.1 in annex 7.1). Country 
measures of institutional quality, taken from the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators data set of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2010), include rule of law, government effectiveness, political 
stability, regulatory quality, and absence of violence/terrorism. 
The key finding is that industries more sensitive to institutions 
have higher participation in complex GVCs in countries that have 
better institutions. This result appears to be robust against sev-
eral different statistical specifications and holds for all measures 
of institutional quality. The relationship is less robust for simple 
flows that cross only one border.2
There is no support at the industry level for rule of law or gov-
ernment effectiveness significantly affecting simple GVC flows, 
but Dollar, Ge, and Yu did not rule this possibility out. The point 
estimates from the statistical exercise are still positive for rule 
of law and government effectiveness on simple GVC participa-
tion, but the standard errors are large enough to make these 
estimates insignificant. In other words, both rule of law and gov-
ernment effectiveness could be important even for simple GVC 
participation, but the study is inconclusive on this point. Quali-
tatively, it is clear that the relationship between institutions and 
GVCs is statistically more established for complex GVC participa-
tion than for simple participation.
The second fact that Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) discovered is 
that complex GVC flows tend to be exported to countries that 
have worse institutions. They found that the effects of institu-
tional quality on GVC development is completely opposite in 
upstream source countries than in downstream direct importing 
countries. Direct importers with weak institutional quality show 
a faster growth in GVC production linkages with their upstream 
suppliers. This may support Jones (2011), who found that the 
availability of intermediate goods is positively related to eco-
nomic development. Economic development is positively related 
to institutional quality.
Recall the finding from Nunn (2007) that higher technology 
industries that produce a more specialized product are more 
sensitive to institutional quality. Thus, poor institutions can 
constrict the domestic production of these type of intermedi-
ate goods. With fewer domestic intermediate goods available, 
domestic firms in developing countries can have an incentive 
to find foreign intermediates. This gives a clear channel for 
poor institutions to be positively related to foreign sourcing of 
upstream intermediates. But Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) did not 
explicitly identify this channel, so other channels may be driving 
faster GVC growth in importers with weak institutional quality. 
One channel could be processing trade, but again this channel 
was not explicitly identified.
So, complex GVC participation in contract-intensive indus-
tries is significantly influenced by the quality of domestic institu-
tions. Countries with weaker institutions deepen their upstream 
TABLE 7.1 Ten most and ten least contract-intensive 
manufacturing industries
Rank Most contract intensive Least contract intensive
1 Photographic equipment 
manufacturing
Poultry processing
2 Compressor manufacturing Flour milling
3 Analytical laboratory instrument 
manufacturing
Petroleum refining
4 Engine equipment manufacturing Corn milling
5 Electronic component 
manufacturing
Aluminum sheet 
manufacturing
6 Packaging machinery 
manufacturing
Aluminum production
7 Book publishers Fertilizer manufacturing
8 Breweries Rice milling
9 Musical instrument manufacturing Primary nonferrous metal
10 Aircraft engine part manufacturing Tobacco drying
Source: Nunn 2007.
164 • Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development
GVC participation to countries with better institutions. And the 
growth of GVC participation is positively related to better insti-
tutions. These findings suggest that institutional quality is an 
important determinant of an industry’s ability to fragment its 
production processes across international borders.
Firm-level evidence for China on domestic institutions 
and firm and city characteristics
Firm data allow modeling the mechanism that drives a firm’s 
selection into different types of GVC categories. This analysis 
can help policymakers create policies that increase participation 
in GVCs. There is strong evidence that local institutions play a 
significant role in firms’ participation in GVCs. This suggests that 
local governments have considerable scope to affect participa-
tion in GVCs both by directly influencing other economic institu-
tions and by indirectly providing support by building appropriate 
infrastructure.
Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) evaluated the firm’s participation 
choice using a cross-section of 11,709 firms in 120 Chinese cities 
that were surveyed in the World Bank Enterprise Survey. The 
dataset allows for measurement of the sourcing and exporting 
behavior of firms. Thus, it is possible to tell whether a firm uses 
imports in production and whether a firm exports final products. 
The two categories create four subcategories of firms:
• Those that use domestic inputs strictly for domestic 
consumption.
• Those that use imports for domestic consumption.
• Those that use imports for foreign consumption (export 
production).
• Those that use domestic inputs for export production.
These categories define types of participation in GVCs. Com-
plex participation, in this context, can be thought of as firms that 
import intermediate goods and export their products.
The data also have several measures of institutional quality 
and other firm and city characteristics that can be used to deter-
mine the effect of those characteristics on the probability that a 
plant will participate in GVC production. The institutional quality 
characteristics include contract enforcement, access to credit, 
customs efficiency, and government intervention.3 These mea-
sures can be thought of as proxies for legal, financial, trade, and 
government institutions. Likewise, firm characteristics such as 
productivity, capital intensity, and size, as well as city characteris-
tics such as transportation infrastructure and economic develop-
ment, can be evaluated to determine the most important predic-
tors of GVC participation.
On the quality of local institutions in the Chinese cities stud-
ied, the main finding is that firms have a higher probability of 
participating in GVCs the more contracts are enforceable, the 
less the government intervenes, the more efficient the customs 
processes (see table A7.1.2 in annex 7.1), and the better access 
firms have to credit. But there is some variation in the relation-
ship between institutions and the type of GVC participation. For 
example, better contract enforcement increases the probability 
that a firm will participate in exporting, but the effect is not sig-
nificant for plants that import but do not export. This suggests 
that foreign buyers may have some sensitivity to contract 
enforcement and may be more willing to buy from firms in areas 
with stronger rule of law.
Among firm characteristics ownership type directly influences 
GVC participation and interacts with institutional quality. The 
highest probability of GVC participation is in firms with foreign 
ownership, followed by those with private and corporate owner-
ship. State ownership significantly lowers the probability of GVC 
participation. Further, how local institutions affect GVC partici-
pation also depends on ownership type. The decision of state-
owned enterprises to participate in GVCs is not significantly 
affected by local institutional quality. But there is strong evi-
dence that the decision of foreign firms to participate in GVCs is 
sensitive to domestic institutions in China, showing that domes-
tic institutional quality is more binding for foreign firms than for 
state firms. One explanation is that state firms can have stronger 
informal institutions than foreign firms. For example, they may 
be able to lean on political connections to manage contract dis-
putes in their favor, whereas foreign firms must rely on the legal 
system. Thus, informal institutions can crowd out GVC participa-
tion to the extent that informal institutions explain different par-
ticipation rates by ownership type.
At the city level there is evidence in China that lower transpor-
tation costs, lower labor costs, higher economic development, 
and higher innovation are all positively correlated with higher firm 
GVC participation. Lower transportation costs are often achieved 
through technology and infrastructure investments, which may 
be necessary, if not sufficient, to develop deeper GVC partici-
pation. Even the best trade channel into an undeveloped region 
may do little to promote GVC participation if other aspects of the 
economic environment do not support such participation. How-
ever, high transportation costs can certainly restrict GVC partici-
pation, especially in resource-based economies where infrastruc-
ture still lags behind that in developed countries.
The positive correlation of GVC participation with lower labor 
costs should be weighed carefully against comparative advan-
tage in China. China has an abundance of labor and a compar-
ative advantage in industries intensive in low-skilled labor. So 
lower wages should be correlated with higher GVC participation 
in China. But it cannot be concluded that lowering wages in a 
sector is generally helpful in promoting GVC participation or 
comparative advantage.
In sum: Less government intervention, higher customs effi-
ciency, better contract enforcement, and more access to bank 
loans significantly increase the probability that firms will partic-
ipate in GVCs.
Institutions in neighboring countries
That a country or locality’s institutions affect its participation in 
GVCs is an intuitive result. What may be more surprising is the 
evidence, summarized here, that neighboring countries’ institu-
tions matter for GVC participation. In particular, neighboring- 
country institutions may have more impact on the efficiency of 
business-to-business linkages in industries that tend to be more 
intensive in contracts.
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The more differentiated or tailored a good, the thinner is the 
market for the good and the more severe is the hold-up prob-
lem.4 In other words, highly differentiated goods are more sen-
sitive to the institutional environment. In manufacturing the 747 
passenger aircraft, Boeing uses reaction engines, which are not 
available in open markets and which do not have reference prices 
established by its manufacturers (firms like Rolls Royce and Gen-
eral Electric). The price, quantity, and especially the characteris-
tics are determined in a usually incomplete negotiation between 
Boeing and the engine supplier because the engine is a differen-
tiated good adapted to the model of aircraft. In the language of 
Williamson (1975), there is fundamental transformation that cre-
ates a specific relationship. Thus, the quality of domestic institu-
tions is a direct channel that can affect these contract-intensive 
industries more than less contract-intensive industries, such as 
undifferentiated agricultural products.
On top of the direct channel, Miranda and Wagner (2015) 
show that neighbors’ institutions could also matter, over and 
above the effect of own-country institutions. They followed the 
original work by Nunn (2007) but also included the role of neigh-
boring country institutions, previously missing from the analysis. 
Own and neighbors’ institutions are related, but they can have 
meaningful differences (figure 7.2). For Chile the neighboring 
rule of law measure is the average of rule of law of Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Peru, weighted by their respective GDPs. The diag-
onal line in figure 7.2 indicates equality between the institutional 
quality in a country and in that country’s neighbors. Most coun-
tries are near the diagonal line, but there is variation, with some 
countries below the line. For example, Hong Kong, China; Sin-
gapore; Norway; Finland; Israel; and Chile have neighbors with 
weaker rule of law than their own. This could be a weak link for 
value chains when some parts of a productive process can be 
outsourced to nearby locations.
Using local and neighbors’ institutions, Miranda and Wagner 
(2015) calculated the average revealed comparative advantage 
by country and industry, separating high contract-intensive 
industries (high share of differentiated inputs) and low contract- 
intensive industries, and countries having neighbors with high 
rule of law (as a measure of contract institutional quality) and 
those having neighbors with low rule of law. Having neighbors 
with weak contract enforcement reduces exports in contract-in-
tensive industries (figure 7.3).
Miranda and Wagner (2015) also found that local institutions 
explain more or less the same amount of variation as the sum of 
physical and human capital (see table A7.1.3 in annex 7.1). They 
also explored what makes neighbors’ institutions more relevant. 
Countries that share a common language and common colo-
nial history would be expected to do more business together 
in contract- intensive sectors than countries that do not share 
those links. The more similar the countries, the more scope 
for “nearsourcing” — outsourcing tasks to nearby countries or 
regions. But precisely in that context, having neighbors with 
FIGURE 7.2 Relationship of own and neighboring countries’ judicial quality (rule of law)
Neighbors’ judicial quality
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Source: Miranda and Wagner 2015 on local and neighboring countries. The rule of law index is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 1998, using Nunn 
2007 data and GeoDist data from the Institute for Research on the International Economy.
Note: Countries in the figure are those with a common land border with their neighbors. The diagonal line indicates equality between the institutional quality in 
a country and in that country’s neighbors.
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weak institutions appears even more binding for business, since 
firms would otherwise be connecting with each other much more 
frequently.
In sum, there seems to be a systematic relationship between 
what a country produces and the ability of its neighbors to 
enforce contracts. The analysis here focuses mostly on the lack 
of contract enforcement upstream, since it uses sectors that 
have contract-intensive procurement and so they are sensitive to 
suppliers with poor contract enforcement. Some tests show that 
downstream contract enforcement could also be important, as in 
sectors with more contract-intensive output — say, because of the 
need to customize the product before selling it, which requires 
certainty.
African involvement in global value chains
African economies have had little involvement in GVCs (Dollar 
2016). One useful measure of position in the value chain is the 
share of imported value added in a country’s exports, a reflec-
tion of economies’ integration with each other and with the 
global economy (figure 7.4). For advanced economies one-third 
of exports were attributed to imported inputs in 2008–12, up 
from one-quarter in 1991–95. For low-income economies and 
emerging market economies other than in Sub- Saharan Africa, 
the average was 21–22% in 2008–12, up from 17–18% in 1991–95. 
Among developing economies Poland and Viet Nam are stand-
outs, with imported inputs accounting for more than one-third of 
their export value.
About two-thirds of Sub- Saharan African economies fall below 
the average value-chain position for developing countries based 
on the value of their exports derived from imports (see figure 
7.4). Oil exporters such as Angola, Chad, Nigeria, and South 
FIGURE 7.3 Average revealed comparative advantage 
across industries and countries, controlling for local 
institutional effects
Revealed comparative advantage
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0.5
1.0
1.5
Neighbors with
weak institutions
Neighbors with
strong institutions
Low contract intensity
High contract intensity
Source: Miranda and Wagner 2015.
FIGURE 7.4 Depth of integration in global value chains of Sub- Saharan African and comparator countries, 2008–12
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Sudan have almost no imported value added in their exports and 
fall on the far right side of the figure. To some extent these econ-
omies are subject to “Dutch disease,” with resource exporters 
tending to have high wages and appreciated exchange rates that 
make it difficult for them to diversify their exports. But this is only 
a partial explanation. These countries are all relatively poor, and 
their oil production is not sufficient to make their citizens wealthy.
On the left of the figure are countries with deeper GVC inte-
gration, but they tend to be resource-poor economies with small 
populations (Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius, São Tomé and 
Principe, Seychelles, and Swaziland). Countries with advanced 
tourism industries that rely on high-value-added imported inputs 
will also show up as having deep involvement in GVCs. Ethiopia 
is an interesting case of a populous yet resource-poor country 
with a high degree of GVC integration, which has grown substan-
tially since 1995.
What accounts for Africa’s low involvement in GVCs? One 
factor, as mentioned, is Dutch disease. But many countries in 
Africa are not resource rich, and yet they still have low involve-
ment in GVCs. And even where Dutch disease is an explanation, 
it should not prevent the development of modern manufacturing 
and services sectors. A key issue in most African economies is 
deficient infrastructure: unreliable power, poor roads and high-
ways, and inefficient ports.
Another issue is economic governance. As discussed, well- 
developed economic institutions, such as property rights and 
the rule of law, have significant positive effects on develop-
ment and on participation in GVCs. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators project of the World Bank publishes a Rule of Law 
Index that “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in par-
ticular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and vio-
lence” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 4). All but six 
African countries are below average for the world (figure 7.5), 
not too surprising because there is a clear relationship between 
GDP per capita and the quality of economic institutions, and 
African countries are relatively poor and, on average, have weak 
institutions.
But there is a lot of dispersion across African countries. 
The regression line in figure 7.5 shows the typical relationship 
between per capita income and the rule of law. Countries above 
the line have unexpectedly good institutions for their level of 
development; countries below the line have unexpectedly poor 
institutions. This is important because countries generally com-
pete with other countries at similar levels of development. If one 
country has good institutions among its cohort, it can expect to 
attract more investment and entrepreneurship and grow faster.
In fact, having a robust rule of law relative to level of develop-
ment is closely correlated with faster growth. Among the large 
countries in Africa with broadly similar GDP per capita, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, and Uganda are well above the regression line, Kenya 
sits right on the line, and Sudan and Nigeria fall well below the 
line. Thus, while the countries are at similar levels of develop-
ment, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda (especially the last two) 
have better economic institutions.
FIGURE 7.5 Institutional quality relative to development level in African countries: Association of Rule of Law Index and 
GDP per capita, 2010
Rule of law index (mean = 0)
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Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (www.govindicators.org); Feenstra and others 2015.
Note: The figure plots the Rule of Law Index for 146 countries in 2010 against per capita GDP measured in purchasing power parity (log scale). By design, the 
index has a mean of zero and a standard deviation across countries of 1.0. Labeled countries are the 10 most populous African countries.
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The International Monetary Fund’s Africa Economic Outlook 
for 2015 includes an estimate of the effect of improvements in the 
investment climate on African exports. The thought experiment 
adjusts different indicators from the average for Sub- Saharan 
Africa to the average for the rest of the world. The investment cli-
mate indicators are an index of infrastructure, credit to the private 
sector (a measure of financial sector depth and efficiency), a rule 
of law index, and the level of import tariffs (indicating how open 
or closed an economy is to world trade). The biggest potential 
gain — a 42% increase in exports — comes from improving infra-
structure (figure 7.6). Credit to the private sector and rule of law 
are also important, accounting for potential increases in exports 
of 29% and 28%. African economies already have relatively low 
trade barriers, so reducing import tariffs to the average for the 
rest of the world boosts exports only 14%. The specific estimates 
in this kind of empirical exercise should be taken with caution. But 
the general point is valid: Africa could expand its involvement in 
global trade, including GVCs, through improvements in its invest-
ment climate, including infrastructure development, stronger 
financial sectors, and improved property rights and rule of law.
Of particular relevance for Africa are neighborhood effects, 
or the problem of reforming countries that have some or all 
neighbors with poor institutions. Some African economies have 
improved their economic institutions, and they tend to be the 
ones with faster growth and some initial involvement in GVCs. 
But in many cases, reformers are bordered by neighbors with 
poor institutions (map 7.1). There is a pocket of reform in East-
ern Africa, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. But these countries are neighbored by Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, and 
Sudan — all with poor institutions. In Western Africa, Ghana and 
Senegal are relative bright spots, but Guinea-Bissau and Nige-
ria drag down the neighborhood. The Southern part of Africa 
around South Africa is another bright spot.
Policy implications
The quality of institutions affects comparative advantage and 
thus participation in GVCs. The stages of the production process 
differ in the extent to which they use simple labor, skilled labor, 
and capital (factor intensity). Activities also differ in their contract 
intensity. Producing a complete, homogeneous product with no 
imported content has simple or no contract intensity; growing 
and exporting bananas is an example. At the other extreme is 
producing a specialized part for a sophisticated electronics 
product. If done at arm’s length, the purchasing firm has to have 
considerable confidence in the contract.
Developing countries in general have a lot of simple labor 
relative to skilled labor and capital. Given those factor endow-
ments, which tend to change only slowly over time, the quality of 
institutions determines whether countries export simple, undif-
ferentiated products or whether they can embed their produc-
tion in more sophisticated value chains. Being involved in value 
chains, in turn, will accelerate technological upgrading, skill 
MAP 7.1 Rule of law across Africa
Below the mean Above the mean
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2014.
Note: Countries are color-coded to reflect how strong or weak their institu-
tions are on an index of property rights and rule of law, rescaled to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0.
FIGURE 7.6 Potential increase in trade in Sub- Saharan 
Africa from improvements in investment climate
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Source: IMF 2015.
Note: Percent increase in Sub- Saharan Africa’s trade if the variable moves from 
the average for Sub- Saharan Africa to the average for the rest of the world.
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development, and capital accumulation. The quality of institu-
tions relative to development level is crucial.
A general policy recommendation from this analysis is that 
developing countries need to improve their institutions — provide 
equitable protection of rights, increase the enforceability of con-
tracts, require more transparency, adopt anticorruption mea-
sures, make customs processes efficient, and encourage financial 
deepening. The focus should be on reducing transaction costs 
so that a country’s firms can easily join GVCs.
Improving institutions across the board is a big challenge, 
of course, and takes time. So, it is worth considering some 
shortcuts that can enhance GVC participation. As seen in ear-
lier chapters, deep trade agreements enhance GVC participa-
tion, probably because those agreements target specific insti-
tutional bottlenecks — such as improving customs administration 
and strengthening property rights and legal recourse. Deep 
agreements are going to be most powerful if several countries 
in a region all participate, improving neighbors’ institutions. The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership had the potential to play this role in the 
Asia–Pacific region, and the U.S. abandonment of the agreement 
is a setback. So far China has not shown much interest in deep 
agreements, but that may change.
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ANNEX 7.1
Results for Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) and 
Miranda and Wagner (2015)
TABLE A7.1.1 Summary of Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) industry results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insdepict × Regulatoryct
0.040***
(0.010)
Insdepict × Stabilityct
0.042***
(0.008)
Insdepict × Govct
0.034***
(0.010)
Insdepict × Lawct
0.026***
(0.009)
K-ratioict × ln(K-endowct)
0.0023***
(0.0001)
0.0023***
(0.0001)
0.0026***
(0.0001)
0.0025***
(0.0001)
Skill-ratioict × ln(Skill-endowct)
0.066***
(0.012)
0.066***
(0.012)
0.065***
(0.012)
0.065***
R-squared 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.716
Fixed effects (country and industry and year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,995 8,995 8,995 8,995
 *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level.
Note: Dependent variable is GVCPict (GVC participation index in industry i by country c at time t). Coefficients are reported. Numbers in brackets are robust 
standard errors. The estimated equation is GVCPict = β0 + β1insdepictinsct + β3kratioict
 × kendowct
 + β2Skill ratioict × Skill endowct + αi + γc + δt + εict, where insdepict is 
a measure of institutional sensitivity and insct is one of 4 measures of country level institutional quality (regulatory, stability, government effectiveness, and rule of 
law). Capital endowments and skill endowments are also interacted with industry- and country- level measures of industrial intensities. The coefficient of interest 
is β1, which is reported in the first four rows of this table. More details can be found in Dollar, Ge, and Yu 2016.
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TABLE A7.1.2 Summary of Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) firm results
Variable
(1)
D2E
(2)
I2P
(3)
I2E
(4)
D2E
(5)
I2P
(6)
I2E
(7)
D2E
(8)
I2P
(9)
I2E
(10)
D2E
(11)
I2P
(12)
I2E
Government 
intervention 0.437*** 1.359*** 1.638***
Custom efficiency 0.428*** 1.318*** 1.563***
Contract 
enforcement 0.406*** 1.347*** 1.622***
Access to finance 0.487*** 1.360*** 1.655***
Ownership structure
State-owned 
enterprises –0.499*** –0.209 –0.572*** –0.51*** –0.210 –0.570*** –0.490*** –0.215 –0.59*** –0.424*** –0.213 –0.585***
Collective-owned 
enterprises –0.769*** –0.714*** –0.928*** –0.78*** –0.732*** –0.973*** –0.775*** –0.72*** –0.93*** –0.756*** –0.710*** –0.921***
Private 0.042 –0.068 –0.097 0.050 –0.065 –0.085 0.0190 –0.072 –0.105 0.002 –0.062 –0.084
Hong Kong, China; 
Macao, China; and 
Chinese Taipei 0.437*** 1.359*** 1.638*** 0.428*** 1.318*** 1.563*** 0.406*** 1.347*** 1.622*** 0.487*** 1.360*** 1.655***
Foreign 1.046*** 1.621*** 2.322*** 1.030*** 1.599*** 2.281*** 1.026*** 1.605*** 2.296*** 1.070*** 1.611*** 2.310***
Firm characteristics
Size 0.431*** 0.434*** 0.814*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.801*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.803*** 0.407*** 0.423*** 0.797***
Age 0.011 –0.004 0.021 0.010 –0.007 0.008 0.008 –0.006 0.012 –0.0003 –0.007 0.011
Capital –0.054** 0.334*** 0.194*** –0.053** 0.336*** 0.197*** –0.058** 0.332*** 0.190*** –0.061** 0.334*** 0.192***
City characteristics
GDP per capita –0.033 0.628*** 0.448*** –0.080 0.554*** 0.303*** –0.090 0.574*** 0.350*** –0.028 0.587*** 0.380***
City wage 0.348* –0.420** 0.088 0.309* –0.471** 0.037 0.540*** –0.339 0.277* 0.126 –0.444** 0.049
Research and 
development share 1.202*** 1.176*** –0.166 1.188*** 1.193*** –0.052 0.852*** 1.045*** –0.512* 0.158 1.069*** –0.415
Transport cost –0.253*** –0.138*** –0.363*** –0.26*** –0.106** –0.294*** –0.237*** –0.15*** –0.37*** –0.269*** –0.163*** –0.405***
 *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level.
Note: See Dollar, Ge, and Yu 2016 for technical notes. Standard errors are omitted.
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TABLE A7.1.3 Summary of Miranda and Wagner (2015) main 
Variable
Log of exports from country in industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Neighbor’s judicial quality × 
contract intensity (ziQ
N
c )
0.159***
(0.494)
0.206***
(0.621)
0.252***
(0.675)
0.140***
(0.559)
0.244***
(0.708
Local judicial quality ×  
contract intensity (ziQc )
0.200***
(0.395)
0.212***
(0.558)
0.220***
(0.605)
0.161***
(0.469)
0.196***
(0.612)
Other determinants of comparative 
advantage No No No Yes Yes
Skill and capital interaction No No Yes No Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects (country and industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 18,383 8,148 8,148 12,934 7,988
R2 0.736 0.770 0.772 0.776 0.774
 *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; significant at 1% level.
Note: Dependent variable is ln xic (natural log of exports in industry i by country c to all other countries). Standardized beta coefficients are reported. Numbers 
in brackets are robust standard errors. The estimated equation is ln xic = ac + ai + βziQc + β
NziQ
N
c  + γXci + γ
NX Nci + εci, with Xci as a vector that includes another 
determinants of comparative advantage and skill and capital interaction for the local country and neighbors (with superscript N). All variables except fixed ef-
fects are interactions between at least one industry-level variable and at least one country-level variable. All neighboring variables (with superscript N) consist 
of interactions with country-level variables but refer to neighboring countries of country c, measured as a weighted average by neighbor’s GDP. More details can 
be found in Miranda and Wagner 2015.
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Notes
1. This chapter summarizes the research findings of two background 
papers. A paper by Dollar, Ge, and Yu (2016) evaluates the impact of 
domestic institutions on global value chain (GVC) participation and is 
sponsored by the Research Institute for Global Value Chains at the Uni-
versity of International Business and Economics in Beijing. The second 
background paper by Miranda and Wagner (2015) examines the impact 
of foreign institutions in neighboring countries on domestic GVC partici-
pation and is sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank.
2. The estimates of this regression are reported in Dollar, Ge, and Yu 
(2016).
3. Customs efficiency is a measure of the time needed for goods to clear 
customs.
4. A measure from Nunn (2007) is used that captures whether an indus-
trial sector is especially sensitive to contracts. Nunn (2007) focuses 
on the share of an industry’s inputs that are differentiated. This is 
implemented using the input-output matrix of a sector and identi-
fying which sectors tend to have more inputs that are traded on a 
bilateral business-to- business relation as opposed to an input that can 
be bought in an arm’s length transaction in a formal exchange. The 
distinction among different goods comes from the classification by 
Rauch (1999) according to whether inputs are traded in open markets 
with referenced prices or not. The case without is interpreted as a dif-
ferentiated good.
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